Talk:Demographics of the Soviet Union

1937 & 1939 censuses

the 1937 and 1939 census has now been published and is available (e.g. see Soviet Censuses of 1937 and 1939 from Yale University Library; This page states that "Stalin told Kraval that the new census would show a figure of 170 million" and that the "results showed a total national population of only 162 million." and finally that the "1939 census also showed a figure of approximately 162 million, but the census takers, mindful of their predecessors' fate, told Stalin the number was 170 million." given this, can we not clear this page up somewhat with more definitive numbers. What is the source of any remaining dispute. Mozzerati 22:46, 2005 Feb 3 (UTC)

Ethnic make up

Pretty sure the ethnic make up is wrong.

-G —Preceding unsigned comment added by 134.117.158.83 (talk) 06:19, 22 November 2007 (UTC)

Is it? What makes you think so? --217.172.29.4 (talk) 07:50, 29 July 2008 (UTC)

Source for Update on Stalin era population

Andreev, EM, et al, Naselenie Sovetskogo Soiuza, 1922-1991. Moscow, Nauka, 1993. ISBN 5-02-013479-1 was published by the Russian Academy of Science and is available at the NY Public Library Slavic Studies division.--Berndd11222 02:08, 25 November 2005 (UTC)

You people are ignorant. The Soviet Union ANNEXED land from Poland during September 1939 which added thirteen million people to the population. Calculations of the 1926 and 1939 censuses by Barbara Anderson and Eric Silver showed a excess deaths ranging between 3 million to 5.5 million.

Territory annexed in 1939 was indeed 13 million but the territories given back to Poland in 1945 Bialystok & Przemysl had a population of 1.5 million and the net transfer of Population to Poland in 1945-46 was about 1.5 million. The Soviet Union picked up a net gain of 10 million from Poland not 13 million. --Berndd11222 02:05, 7 January 2006 (UTC)

As for the calculations of Anderson & Silver all I can say is that I assume that they consider the 8 million deaths in the 1932-33 famine as " natural". --Berndd11222 02:05, 7 January 2006 (UTC)

I would guess they don't accept the 8 million figure as proven. Many of the missing from the famine period were probably never born.~Mack2~ (talk) 05:33, 26 January 2010 (UTC)

The official demographics of Ukraine stated a 1913 population of 35.2 million. The 1940 figure was at 41.3 million and rose only to 41.8 million in 1959. Source: "Great Soviet Encyclopedia"

Ukraine Population per 1926 census 29.043 million, 1939 census 30.960 million a gain of only 2 million in 13 years. In 1939-45 the Ukranine picked up territory of about 7.8 million from Poland, 1.5 million from Romania, 700,000 from Czechoslovikia(Trans-Carpathia in 1945} and a natural increase of 1.4% in 1939 of .4 million yielding a total of 41.3 million in 1940 whithin the postwar(1946) borders of the Ukraine. The Soviets always quoted the 1940 figure of 41.3 million with the annexed territories included never mentioning the census data of 1939 with only 31 million.--Berndd11222 09:02, 7 January 2006 (UTC)

Late Tsarist figures overstated the population. I think the 1914 figures counted 178 million excluding Finland. I think McEvedy and Jones give the Russian Empire 170 million including Finland, which works out to 167 million excluding Finland. 173.66.5.216 (talk) 06:33, 27 May 2017 (UTC)

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Losses due to Soviet Terror 1917-89

A recently published source in Russia has given a detailed analysis of Soviet losses in the Communist era. Vadim Erlikman. Poteri narodonaseleniia v XX veke : spravochnik. Moscow 2004. ISBN 5931651071. Here is a recap of the losses according to Vadim Erlikman.

During Russian Revolution 1917-22- Red Terror of regular units and partisans 1.7 million deaths. Also he estimates deaths due to White terror at 300,000.

Red Terror in Central Asian uprising of 1918-33, 250,000 deaths.

USSR from 1923-34- Executed 200,000; deaths in GULAG and labor colonies 1.0 million.

Collectivization 1929-33- Killed in uprisings 50,000 and 950,000 deaths due to deportations. He also lists 7.0 million demographic deaths due to famine during the collectivization but does not attribute them to Soviet government policy.

USSR from 1935-41-Executed 1,000,000; deaths in GULAG and labor colonies 2.5 million. Deaths due to deportations 350,000

USSR from 1941-45-Executed 200,000; deaths in GULAG and labor colonies 1.2 million. Deaths due to deportations 300,000

USSR from 1945-53-Executed 100,000; deaths in GULAG and labor colonies 350,000. Deaths due to deportations 150,000

USSR from 1954-89-Executed 500; deaths in GULAG and labor colonies 500.

The grand total for the entire Soviet era was 10,050,000-(Executed 2.7 million; deaths in GULAG and labor colonies 4.8 million. Deaths due to deportations 1.7 million and 850,000 by partisans)

Deaths from 1922-53 due to executions according to official data were about 800,000 but this does not include estimated summary executions. Official data for GULAG deaths was 2.5 million but this excludes deaths in labor colonies and persons deported which were also estimated.
--Berndd11222 15:08, 7 January 2006 (UTC)

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Other Points of View

The number of losses in the Soviet era has been the subject of intense debate. The following link to articles in the Journal Soviet Studies presents different points of view on this topic [[1]].

The historian R. J. Rummel has estimated losses in the Soviet era at 62 million. This is detailed in his book Lethal Politics- Transaction 1996- ISBN 89-28836.
--Berndd11222 15:08, 7 January 2006 (UTC)

Rummel's methodology is questionable and many of his sources obsolete. As I recall, he claimed that Stalin's era resulted to some 40 million deaths - blatantly impossible when you compare it to actual demographics of Soviet Union; one needs to figure in 27 million war losses in addition.--Mikoyan21 12:26, 13 June 2007 (UTC)

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A Comparison of the USSR with Czarist Russia and the US :

In Czarist Russia in 1913 the death rate per 100 persons was 3.2
In the USSR in 1930 the death rate per 100 persons was 2.7
In the USSR in 1940 the death rate per 100 persons was 2.1
In the USSR in 1950 the death rate per 100 persons was 1.2

In the US in 1913 the death rate for whites per 100 persons was 1.35
In the US in 1913 the death rate for blacks per 100 persons was 2.03
In the US in 1930 the death rate for whites per 100 persons was 1.08
In the US in 1930 the death rate for blacks per 100 persons was 1.63
In the US in 1940 the death rate for whites per 100 persons was 1.04
In the US in 1940 the death rate for blacks per 100 persons was 1.38
In the US in 1950 the death rate for whites per 100 persons was 0.95
In the US in 1950 the death rate for blacks per 100 persons was 1.12

Sources:
For Czarist Russia in 1913- European Historical Statistics 1750-1975; Facts on File 1980 ISBN 0-871963299
For USSR 1930-50-Andreev, EM, et al, Naselenie Sovetskogo Soiuza, 1922-1991. Moscow, Nauka, 1993. ISBN 5-02-013479-1
For US - Statistical History of the US from Colonial Times to present- Basic Books 1976 ISBN 0465082033-
Berndd11222 15:08, 7 January 2006 (UTC)

Population dynamics in the 1970s and 1980s

I removed a phrase about "improving health services in southern republics", added into GSE ref by someone, because in that GSE article isn't said anything on that.

I also added {{NPOV-section}} tag, because I believe the section to be heavily biased currently. Here are some of my concrete points on what is wrong with the section (each of them deserves {{NPOV-section}} tag in my opinion):

• It focuses on death rates, while the population growth parameter, which is much more important for the population dynamics (because roughly, if we don't consider migration, "population growth"="birth rate"-"death rate", i.e. it determines, whether the population grows or declines), is not even mentioned. Even a short sentence on that, inserted by me before, was removed without any explanations. Blaming the USSR for certain variations of death rates and "ignoring" always positive population growth, in contrast to negative one in most of the post-Soviet states, looks at least strange. Another parameter, birth rate, as important as death rate, almost isn't mentioned too (except a short sentence, inserted by me).
• There is very few actual data in the section, but it's full of interpretations of missing data. "Attention of Western demographers and Sovietologists" and "debates and discussion among them" are considered to be the most relevant for the section. While "Soviet officials" must "defend and explain" variations in their country's mortality to them. Then perhaps the article Demographics of the United States should present only point of view of Eastern bloc's and Soviet Americanists? But it doesn't, it just presents the data from various sources, not its interpretation by someone, and due to this that article is pretty neutral in my opinion. A few interpretations both Soviet and Western could be present, but only after all related data is presented.
  • For the same reason an extended citation of a Western researcher's point of view on the whole decades of Soviet demography statistics (while the statistics itself is almost missing) constitutes to the bias and would be irrelevant even if corresponding Soviet citation should be present.
• First, the exact period should be presented, when "the percentage who were Russians was gradually being reduced" and it should be clarified, that the percentage is relatively to the total population of the USSR. Second, it should be mentioned, that number of Russians always increased, and their percentage within the Russian SFSR was quite stable at least between 1974-1986 (82.6-82.8 % according to GSE Yearbooks)
• The focus of the article extends behind the 1970s and 1980s limits and includes also the 1960s. Furthermore, the following abstract quote is present:"Soviet demographers and health specialists remained silent about the mortality increases until the late 1980s". As the coverage of mortality rates in Soviet sources from 1960-1970 is not mentioned, the impression is that all increases were hidden from the public. I looked into the GSE and its 1980 Yearbook and found, that the (increasing) mortality statistics from 1965 to 1979 are present there. Therefore, the statement above is wrong at least for this period. I admit, that somewhere in the 1980s public's access to mortality data (especially death rates by ages) was limited only to researchers in the field (i.e. it was marked "Для служебного пользования"), but this fact should be clarified, and earlier coverage of mortality by Soviet sources should be presented too.
• Not just the word "dramatic" is a bias in this excerpt:"dramatic reversal of the path of declining mortality in the 1960s-1970s". Much more important is that the late 1970s saw the similar reversal of the path of declining birth rate: it grew from 17.4 in 1970 to 18.3 in 1979 (according to GSE 1980 Yearbook). But as I said, birth rate is ignored in the section.
• Soviet government's activities since the early 1980s to improve the situation with mortality and other parameters is not mentioned. While, citing "Malaya Meditsinskaya Entsiklopedia", published in Russia in 1991-1996 (more about the encyclopedia is here), the new demographics strategy, introduced in 1981, was effective. Furthermore, the table there shows, that between 1981-1986 birth rate grew, death rate declined, infant mortality declined and population growth increased.[2] Nothing of this data is mentioned in the article.

I don't plan to fix the article in the foreseen future (although there still is certain little chance, that I'll try to fix it myself one day), partly because my additions are removed without explanations, partly because I'm working on other topics right now. But {{NPOV-section}} will be present here at least until above points are fixed, showing, that the section is biased at least in my opinion. I'll remove the tag only when the looks neutral to me. Cmapm 15:35, 10 July 2006 (UTC)

Response to Cmapm. Thank you for your detailed comments. As you well know, this section started out as a bland and basically misleading section about the population steadily growing, birth rates steadily declining (except in "southern republics" -- not my term), and death rates steadily declining. And the only reference for the trends was the BSE edition from 1977, with the latest data it cited referring to 1974. This was far from a "neutral" picture of developments in the region. That there was/is a "health crisis" in the Soviet Union and (now) in Russia has been acknowledged widely both in that country and abroad. That's not my term, but it's still widely used. When it was first announced, in the Eberstadt article that I cited, this became a matter of wide discussion. When I first visited the Soviet Union, it was a matter of completely "private" discussion because Soviet population specialists weren't talking about it, and indeed the data were embargoed in the First Department of Goskomstat. Those are "true facts," not an opinion: there was an upswing in reported mortality among adults and infants; Goskomstat had closed the data "in one day" and ultimately opened "in one day" (as I was told by a leading demographer).

In the meantime, those of us who were interested in Soviet population did the best we could to figure out what the trends were and what their explanation might be. Some alarmists in the West pointed to failing health care, environmental disaster, and the priorities of the political leaders. I've given them about as much due as they merit in the current version of this essay. But they ought to be cited because they did "break the news story," so to speak, even if their interpretation was exaggerated and alarmist. As I mentioned in the discussion before this article was moved to its own place, the best work inside the Soviet Union at the time was being done by Shkolnikov (and others in the institute with A.G. Vishnevsky, such as Vasin and Avdeev (on infant mortality)), and later by Shkolnikov working with French demographers at INED in Paris. It was in fact the French who first noticed the aberrant trends in adult mortality in the Soviet Union in the 1960's and 1970s (in the article that I cited). And Shkolnikov and Vasin and others started working on the causes and figuring out what was going on. They and the French explored a variety of possible underlying causes, including alcoholism (which Shkolnikov and Vassin showed mattered by a quite literally month-by-month exploration of the ups and downs and ups in mortality trends around the time of Gorbachev's anti-alcohol campaign). But in later work, they looked at a range of factors basically coming up with the interpretation that Kingkade and Arriaga gave at the NAS meeting in ca. 1992 (which I also attended, as did Shkolnikov and many others).

Some other researchers, Anderson and Silver, proposed a possible "cohort" explanation for the rising adult mortality -- that the rise was the long-term consequence of the hardships undergone by the Soviet population during World War II. They found some correlation there in a paper published in Population and Development Review, but the results were not conclusive because a typical "cohort" explanation focuses on a fairly narrow ranges of ages of people who underwent some privation or shock (famine, war), whereas the rising adult mortality in the USSR seemed to affect a 20-30 year age group. However, one implication of their research is that the rising mortality might eventually "work its way through" the system and things would return to normal. As you may know (and as I cited earlier in a quote that you deleted earlier), in Russia at least, this hasn't happened even yet (or at least by 2001) according to Shkolnikov in the paper that he presented as a recipient of the award from the IUSSP.

I am willing to help to improve the coverage here, including by supplying long series of birth and death statistics if you want them (they're basically in the sources that I cited -- but I can't put them into table format in Wikipedia; someone else would have to take charge of that, though maybe I can do a graphic that would be uploadable). But in fact the issue of what was happening with health care and mortality rates from the late 60's through end of the 80's in the USSR was the subject of a great deal of research by many people in several countries (including especially the US, UK, France, Russia, Ukraine, and the Baltic states). I think I have characterized the major different voices accurately: some western crisis-mongers, some western "neutral" analyst-demographers seeking to understand what was happening, some Soviet officials shutting down the data and keeping anybody from getting new or detailed data for 10 years, and some Soviet demographers very interested in analyzing what was happening in part to begin to devise remedies -- whether to errors in the statistics or in the health policy realm.

Once the data were opened again, however, and a lot of new data were published, including new Tablitsy smertnosti (life tables), it became possible to distinghish between what might be artifactual and what might be real in any trends. And once Shkolnikov and the INED researchers gained access in that same period (late 1980's) to detailed cause-of-death records and data (all of this was also shut off for many years in the First Department), they were able to understand the causes and possible remedies. He looked carefully at detailed data by province in Russia, for example, and with a very few exceptions, the age and death data looked "reasonable," i.e., did not suffer from obvious deficiencies in the sex-ratios or age-heaping. So for Russia, at least, it seemed unlikely that rise in mortality rates was due to age-related data. (A totally different story in Central Asia, however, where age data in censuses and vital statistics were very flawed, and completeness of death reporting was questionable.) But there would still be a lot to be gained by exploring the cause of death data. And so Shkolnikov worked with Mesle and others to standardize the Soviet cause-of-death data so that they were consistent with the latest ICD so that comparisons could be made across time and space.

And it turned out, as I mentioned already in the article, that there was no necessary connection between the rising in infant mortality rates and the rise in adult mortality rates in the USSR in the 1970's. The former were largely a result of improved data (more complete reporting of infant deaths), especially in Central Asia. The "alarmists" who had first pointed to the rise of infant mortality and contended that it was mostly real and denied that it was mostly in Central Asia, were partly right but by accident: the rise was almost exclusively in Central Asia, but whether it was real or an artifact remained in dispute until some Soviet health specialists and Goskomstat demographers (e.g., Andreev and Ksenofontova, Al'bitsky et al.) really probed and found huge understatements of infant mortality in the official statistics from Central Asia; this meant that any improvement in the coverage of infant deaths in the region during the 1970s was likely to lead to increasing reported rates, but this did not mean that the actual mortality was increasing, rather that the high infant mortality rates that had been overlooked before because of poor data were now beginning to be registered. And Anderson and Silver had provided an explanation for the upswing in reported infant mortality by pointing out that Goskomstat had implemented improvements in the data collection procedures, and in fact tried to impose a consistent standard across the republics of the USSR, but this had the perhaps paradoxical effect of producing increasing reported rates in regions where infant deaths had been underreported in the past. So it was by trying to do good (improve data quality) that Goskomstat produced certain very inconvenient results; the response by higher officials, however, was to close the data (infant mortality data after 1974 were not published until the late 1980s').

When I have time, and if it seems worthwhile, I'll respond to some or your specific recommendations. But I'm not going to waste any time on this if you are going to insist that a balanced story is not neutral. I dispute your overall characterization of the essay, which did in fact seek balance and also cited the key works, actors, and researchers from that era regarding the trends in the last 20 years of the Soviet Union. Of course we all need to be sensitive in choice of words, and we all need a good editor and critic, and shouldn't be "defensive" if our prior interpretation or rendition of things is challenged even by a NPV.

(I could also add quite a bit regarding some other issues that I know a lot about, but would prefer to stay out of them, such as the never-ending squabbles about the losses due to collectivation, the 1932-3 famine, "Stalin's terror," and WW II. I think that as long as certain individuals are alive, they will continue with their campaigns to construct history to fit their particular points of view.)Mack2 16:54, 10 July 2006 (UTC)Mack2 17:19, 10 July 2006 (UTC)

It seems, that all the edits and discussion began earlier, than you think: after these edits into the article on the USSR, which I saw to had focused just on problems, "forgetting" about the permanent population growth in the USSR in contrast to the permanent population decline in post-Soviet Russia. But it's not the case. I didn't accuse anyone, I just looked at the section in it's present shape and saw it to be far from neutral.

The data on the IMR (presented by you on my Talk Page) would certainly be essential for the article, but only along with the same data for population growth, birth rate, death rate. Meanwhile, my other points should also be addressed, because I see them to be essential for NPOV as well.

I should dispute the claim, that "it was in fact the French who first noticed the aberrant trends in adult mortality in the Soviet Union in the 1960's and 1970s". Maybe for all Western demographers this is true, but not for all Soviet ones. First, for overall mortality this doesn't seem to be true, because as I said, the mortality data is presented e.g. in GSE 3rd ed., 24th vol., 1977 (citing it, mortality per thousand:1960-7.1, 1965-7.3, 1970-8.2, 1974-8.7) and, I suspect, in earlier Soviet publications was presented too. Second, the data on adult mortality certainly existed in Goskomstat, and although it was probably marked "Для служебного пользования" (ДСП), it certainly was studied by some Soviet demographers (because it was essential for government's demographic strategy), although their publications on this were also marked ДСП and were unavailable for the majority of scientific community.

I still believe, that first, all data should be presented and only after that - a few if any interpretations by Soviet and Western demographers. And it should be taken into account, that serious research of trends by the Soviet demographers was held much earlier, than by Shkolnikov. Shkolnikov worked in the Moscow Aviation Institute and received Candidate of Sciences in 1987. It seems, that his first serious works are dated 1988. I understand, that Shkolnikov is well-known in the West, but e.g. Laboratory of Demography at the Moscow State University held similar research since 1965, and its scientists published a lot of public works on this, even during the early-1980s-period-of-secrecy (see e.g. Osobennosti demograficheskogo razvitiya v SSSR/Pod red. R.S. Rotovoi, Moscow, 1982). Cmapm 08:53, 12 July 2006 (UTC)

cmapm, Thanks for this response. I can see where things need to go. Certainly Goskomstat knew of problems, and the data were shut down before any "westerners" commented on it -- though Vallin and Chesnais were the first to publish openly on the apparent aberrations. I should note again that the reversal of declining mortality was noted in several countries in Europe, and even at the meeting of the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP) a panel was organized by an Hungarian researcher to draw attention to the issue (but that was late, ca. 1986 as I recall).

As for the research groups, as opposed to the government statistics office (at which the leading specialist on mortality and overall population reproduction issues was Yevgenii Andreev, who I met a few times -- in the post-Soviet period he moved over to work with Vishnevsky's group, to join some of the "junior" people who were there including Vasin, Shkolnikov and others) -- in fact there were several different groups or centers in Moscow. These groups included the MGU researchers,the most senior of whom was Valentey, but this group for quite a while focused rather more on theoretical (teoriia vosproizvodstva naronaseleniia or titles of that ilk, or, on bibliography building, rather than on practical issues of demographic analysis (though certainly they published several books on theory and methods). Also there was Rybakovsky (a kind of isolated researcher who was in the AkNauki and mainly worked on labor and migration; and Bednyi, who mainly worked on health issues. And then the largest in the 1980's was Anatoly Vishnevsky's demographic research group (who left the Aknauki -- and also left Rybakovsky) and received sponsorship originally of Mintruda. It had several researchers onfertility, labor, migration (e.g., Zaionchkovskaya and her subgroup of geographers including G. Vitkovskaya and others; she was also wife of the quite famous Viktor Perevedentsev), mortality, and other issues. Probably the best known researchers on fertility in the late Soviet years were Vishevsky and A. Volkov (at least in Moscow -- there were serious population research centers also only in Kyiv, especially under Steshenko, and Riga, especially under Zvidrins, except for work on geography of population/migration, etc. in Novosibirsk). In addition, there was Rymashevskaya's big Institute for the Scientific Study of Human Population, which had a similar visibility to that of Zaslavskaya, but this one focused more on labor, gender, and social policy, as well as the Taganrog project, but not on core demographic issues of mortality and fertility and population growth (this was mainly Vishnevsky's sphere, almost like the distinction between those who do "demography" -- focused essentially on fertility, mortality, and migration -- and those who "population studies" -- focused more broadly on social issues and social policy, not just on core demographic topics).

In any case, all of these people knew one another, but to some extent they were also rivals with one another for scarce research resources but they guarded their special territory. And so they each found sponsors of one kind or another. The kto-kogo of all this partly was affected by nationality (those who got the more "prestigious" appointments were non-Jews). But when it came to data access, nobody outside of Goskomstat seemed to have access to the detailed mortality data after the data were closed in 1975 or so -- until, one day in 1987 or so, they all opened up again. However, I agree with you that one must assume that at least some people within Goskomstat were well aware of it, even if they kept silent in public.

Researchers outside of Goskomstat were also eager to be able to address contemporary issues, since that was after all an exciting intellectual time beginning in 1986 when it was thought desirable to open up so many topics for public investigation. So once the doors to the detailed data were unlocked again, then Goskomstat researchers also started publishing and evaluating data, but many other reseaarchers started addressing some old and sensitive issues such as war losses in the Great Patriotic War, the sources of change in infant mortality, and also some new topics in "social demography" including alcohol use, suicide, crime, and abortion. They were looking at these things not because they had any special motive or agenda, but rather because for decades these topicw were out of bounds, i.e., not publicly investigated. A couple of interesting volumes on novel topics like this were edited by Vishnevsky (I think it was he).

So when I get a chance (maybe it won't be for a month or two, alas) I will put up the data series into tables and post them here. I plan to include life expectancy at birth data rather than crude death rates because the crude death rates tend to increase simply as the population gets older, while life expectancy data are not affected by the age structure. For the same reason, it is much better to report the total fertility rates (TFR's) than to rely on crude birth rates to represent the underlying path of fertility, because TFR's are not affected by age structure. So I will be trying to post series on TFR from 1950-1990, IMR from 1950-1990, and Eo (Life expectancy at birth) from 1950-1990, all when I can find the time. I am about to go on a family vacation, and then have to prepare for my fall obligations. But I would like to get this article done to your satisfaction in a reasonable time.--Mack2 18:43, 13 July 2006 (UTC)

demographic statistics source

Anyone know where these figures came from? They look like they're from the factbook but they're not cited to anything. I updated the section according to the 1990 factbook for now, but if anyone has a link to the 1991 edition (which I can't find), then we can use that. LokiiT (talk) 21:05, 4 October 2009 (UTC)

The crude death rate had been gradually decreasing as well - from 23.7 per thousand in 1926 to 8.7 in 1974

False - the death rate was high during the time of hungers, great terror and wars and low between them. Xx236 (talk) 10:20, 9 April 2013 (UTC)

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